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TOUCHING A NERVE: HERTZ V. FRIEND’S 
IMPACT ON THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS 
ACT’S MINIMUM DIVERSITY REQUIREMENT 
Kimberly Nakamaru∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 23, 2010, in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,1 the U.S. 
Supreme Court looked at the plain language of a federal 
jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), and unanimously decided 
that a corporation’s “principal place of business” is the state in which 
its “nerve center”—typically its headquarters—is located.2 The Hertz 
holding is relatively straightforward. However, the Hertz Court’s 
plain-language interpretation of § 1332(c) suggests how the Court 
may resolve a circuit split regarding the interpretation of another 
federal jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), commonly known 
as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).3 
CAFA, the statute granting federal jurisdiction over Hertz, 
provides that federal jurisdiction requires only “minimal diversity”—
that any plaintiff is a citizen of a state different from that of any 
defendant.4 Before Congress enacted CAFA, traditional federal 
diversity jurisdiction required complete diversity, meaning that all 
plaintiffs and defendants had to have been citizens of different 
states.5 CAFA thus expanded federal diversity jurisdiction over class 
 
 ∗ J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Anthropology, June 2006, Princeton 
University. I would like to thank Loyola Law School Los Angeles Professor Georgene M. Vairo; 
the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, especially Richard Tuminello and 
Elena DeCoste Grieco; and my husband, David Pidancet, for their valuable guidance, critiques, 
and encouragement. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 1186. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). 
 4. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Federal jurisdiction under CAFA also requires that the amount in 
controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests or costs.” Id. 
§ 1332(d)(2). 
 5. Id. § 1332(a); Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806) (interpreting traditional 
diversity statute to require complete diversity). 
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actions. Since CAFA’s enactment, however, the Supreme Court has 
not determined whether federal jurisdiction exists when, for example, 
a class of plaintiffs from California files an action under CAFA 
against a corporation that is incorporated in Delaware but has its 
principal place of business in California. For the purpose of 
traditional diversity jurisdiction, complete diversity is destroyed by 
the commonality of the plaintiff class members’ California 
citizenships on the one hand and the corporation’s principal place of 
business on the other. But, can the corporation rely on its Delaware 
citizenship to create minimal CAFA jurisdiction? 
This Comment suggests that it cannot. As discussed below, the 
Hertz Court’s plain-meaning interpretation of the jurisdictional 
statute § 1332(c) suggests that the Court will likewise adopt the 
Fourth Circuit’s plain-meaning interpretation of § 1332(c)—which 
prevents a corporation sued under CAFA from creating federal 
jurisdiction by relying on its one diverse citizenship. Part II of this 
Comment describes Hertz’s key facts and procedural history. Part III 
explains how the Hertz Court established the “nerve center” test for 
determining a corporation’s principal place of business. Part IV sets 
up the application of Hertz to CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement 
by comparing the policy rationales behind § 1332(c)–(d). Finally, 
Part V applies Hertz to CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement and 
ultimately concludes that a corporation should not be permitted to 
rely on its citizenship that is diverse from the plaintiffs’ to remove to 
federal court because such reliance destroys minimal diversity and 
undermines the plain language of § 1332(c). 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In September 2007, plaintiffs Melinda Friend and John Nhieu 
filed a class action complaint in a California state court against their 
employer, the Hertz Corporation (“Hertz”), seeking damages under 
California wage and hour laws for failure to provide overtime wages, 
meal and rest breaks, and vacation pay.6 The plaintiff class 
comprised California citizens who had allegedly suffered harms 
similar to Friend and Nhieu’s.7 
 
 6. Friend v. Hertz Corp., No. C-07-5222 MMC, 2008 WL 7071465, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
15, 2008), aff’d, 297 F. App’x 690 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1181. 
 7. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1186. 
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On October 11, 2007, Hertz removed the action to the Northern 
District of California pursuant to CAFA,8 which grants federal 
district courts jurisdiction over a class action when the matter in 
controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and “any member of a class of 
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”9 Hertz 
argued that the federal court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 
CAFA because Hertz and the plaintiffs were citizens10 of different 
states.11 However, Friend and Nhieu argued that removal was 
improper for lack of CAFA diversity jurisdiction because the class 
members and Hertz were all California citizens.12 
To prove that it was diverse from the plaintiffs, Hertz submitted 
a declaration by an employee relations manager that purported to 
show that Hertz’s principal place of business was in New Jersey 
rather than in California.13 The declaration stated that the “leadership 
of Hertz and its domestic subsidiaries” was in New Jersey and that its 
“core executive and administrative functions . . . [were] carried out” 
there and “to a lesser extent” in Oklahoma.14 The declaration also 
stated that Hertz facilities existed in forty-four states, and that the 
state that accounts for 12 percent of the nation’s population, 
California, contained “273 of Hertz’s 1,606 car rental locations; 
about 2,300 of its 11,230 full-time employees; about $811 million of 
its $4.371 billion in annual revenue; and about 3.8 million of its 
 
 8. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1453, 1711–1715 (2006)). Because CAFA will play a central role 
in my later analysis, it is helpful to briefly introduce it here. CAFA, a key component of President 
George W. Bush’s tort reform efforts, was enacted to prevent “forum shopping” between state 
and federal courts. Georgene M. Vairo, The Complete CAFA: Analysis and Developments Under 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, LEXISNEXIS (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at Part I.A) 
(on file with author). To do this, CAFA expanded federal jurisdiction over “large class actions 
and other complex, state-claim-based litigation in which there is minimal diversity.” Id. 
Additionally, CAFA enables state court cases that fall within CAFA’s provisions to be removed 
to federal court. Id. 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (conferring CAFA jurisdiction based on amount in 
controversy and diversity of citizenship); Hertz, 2008 WL 7071465, at *1. 
 10. For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction and removal, “a corporation shall be deemed to 
be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its 
principal place of business . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
 11. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1186. Hertz’s Notice of Removal alleged that the amount in 
controversy exceeded $5,000,000, that each class member was a California citizen, and that Hertz 
was a Delaware citizen based on its state of incorporation and a New Jersey citizen based on its 
principal place of business. Hertz, 2008 WL 7071465, at *1. 
 12. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1186. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
  
1022           LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1019 
approximately 21 million annual [rentals].” 15 
At the time the Hertz lawsuit was filed, federal courts applied 
one of three different tests to determine a corporation’s principal 
place of business: (1) the “place of operation” test; (2) the “nerve 
center” test; and (3) the “total activities” test.16 “[T]he ‘place of 
operations’ test locates a corporation’s principal place of business in 
the state which ‘contains a substantial predominance of corporate 
operations.’”17 Under the place-of-operations test, the first step is to 
determine the amount of business activity in each state, and then, if 
the amount of activity is “significantly larger” or “substantially 
predominates” in one state that state is the corporation’s principal 
place of business.18 The nerve-center test places a corporation’s 
principal place of business in the state containing the corporation’s 
headquarters.19 Finally, the total-activities test encompasses aspects 
of the both the place-of-operations and the nerve-center tests and 
considers all relevant factors, weighing them on a case-by-case 
basis.20 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the 
place-of-operations test when it determined a corporation’s principal 
place of business.21 Accordingly, the District Court for the Northern 
District of California applied that test and found that California was 
Hertz’s principal place of business.22 In reaching this conclusion, the 
district court found that the “plurality of each of the relevant business 
activities” was in California because “‘the differential between the 
amount of those activities’ in California and the amount in ‘the next 
closest state’ was ‘significant.’”23 Due to the lack of diversity 
jurisdiction, the district court concluded that removal was improper 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3625 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
 17. Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 18. Id. at 500–02. 
 19. Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 20. Gafford v. Gen. Electric, 997 F.2d 150, 162–63 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 21. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 297 F. App’x 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1181 
(2010). 
 22. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2010). 
 23. Id. (quoting Friend v. Hertz, No. C-07-5222 MMC, 2008 WL 7071465, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 15, 2008)). 
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and remanded the case to the state court.24 
Hertz appealed the remand order.25 On October 30, 2008, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding in a memorandum 
order, finding that the district court had correctly applied the place-
of-operations test to determine Hertz’s principal place of business.26 
Referencing policy considerations underlying diversity jurisdiction, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Hertz was not in jeopardy of being 
mistreated in California courts based on its extensive California 
business activities.27 
Not to be deterred, Hertz filed a petition for writ of certiorari.28 
On June 8, 2009,29 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
the differences among the circuit courts of appeals as to the correct 
test for determining corporate citizenship.30 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
After reviewing the history of corporate citizenship and the 
circuit courts’ disparate interpretations of the statutory provisions, 
the Supreme Court unanimously held that: 
principal place of business” is best read as referring to the 
place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities. It is the place that 
Courts of Appeals have called the corporation’s “nerve 
center.” And in practice it should normally be the place 
where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided 
that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, 
control, and coordination, i.e., the “nerve center,” and not 
simply an office where the corporation holds its board 
meetings . . . .31 
The Court had three primary reasons for reaching this 
conclusion: (1) the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) 
supports the nerve-center approach; (2) the nerve-center approach 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2006)). 
 26. Hertz, 297 F. App’x at 691, vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1181. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1187. 
 29. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 129 S. Ct. 2766, 2766 (2009). 
 30. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1187. 
 31. Id. at 1192. 
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promotes administrative simplicity; and (3) the statute’s legislative 
history provides an interpretive benchmark based on simplicity.32 
This section explains and analyzes each of the Court’s reasons in 
turn. 
First, the Court performed a textual analysis on the text of 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).33 The statute considers a corporation a citizen of 
the “[s]tate where it has its principal place of business.”34 The Court 
pointed out that the word “place” is singular and that according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the word “principal” refers to the “main, 
prominent” or “leading” place.35 Furthermore, because “place” 
follows “[s]tate where” in the statute, the Court found that the place 
at issue is a leading place within a state rather than the state itself.36 
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that a corporation’s 
headquarters, or nerve center, is the place within a state that 
constitutes the corporation’s principal place of business pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).37 In comparison with tests that have led 
courts, such as the Hertz district court, to look at the total amount of 
business activities in a given state, the Court found that the nerve-
center test best conforms to the spirit of the statute.38 
Second, the Court opted for the comparatively simpler nerve-
center test to promote administrative ease and increased 
predictability.39 The Court considered the nerve-center test to be 
comparatively simpler than other tests because a corporation’s 
headquarters, which is typically equated with its nerve center, 
suggests a single location.40 Zeroing in on a single, predictable 
location, for example, is much easier than trying to choose from 
amongst the many places where a corporation conducts its “general 
business activities.”41 
 
 32. Id. at 1192–94. 
 33. Id. at 1192–93. 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006). The statute provides that a corporation is also a citizen of 
the “[s]tate by which it has been incorporated.” Id.; Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192. 
 35. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192 (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 1989) 
(def. (A)(I)(2))). 
 36. Id. at 1193. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1192–93. 
 39. Id. at 1193. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1193–94. 
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The Court reasoned that administrative simplicity is a “major 
virtue” in a jurisdictional statute because “[c]omplex jurisdictional 
tests complicate a case, eating up time and money as the parties 
litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right 
court to decide those claims.”42 Clear rules, then, increase the 
likelihood that cases will be heard on the merits, decrease the 
likelihood that cases will be appealed and reversed, and decrease 
waste of judicial resources.43 
The Court also found that a clear jurisdictional test increases 
predictability both for corporations and for individuals—likely to be 
plaintiffs in cases like Hertz.44 Corporations value predictability 
because it enhances their ability to make savvy business and 
investment decisions.45 Similarly, the ability to predict which state a 
court will likely deem a corporation to be a citizen of is helpful to 
individuals deciding whether to file in state or federal court.46 
Third, the Court reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)’s 
legislative history indicated a preference for a simple test.47 
Specifically, the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue rejected its 
initial version of the proposed statute as too complex and impractical 
to apply because it included a numerical test that deemed a 
corporation a citizen of the state in which it earned more than half of 
its gross income.48 Accordingly, the Court found that the legislative 
history suggested that the words “principal place of business” in the 
statute should be interpreted to be no more complex than the rejected 
“half of gross income” test.49 Because the nerve-center test only 
requires locating a corporation’s headquarters, the Court held that it 
better corresponded with the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1).50 
 
 42. Id. at 1193. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1194. 
 48. Id. The rejected version of the proposed statute recommended “that section 1332 of the 
Revised Judicial Code be amended so as to provide that a corporation may not invoke the Federal 
jurisdiction in a state in which it is doing business and from which it receives more than half of its 
gross income.” S. REP. NO. 85-1380, at 3132 (1958). 
 49. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194. 
 50. Id. 
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Therefore, because Hertz’s unchallenged declaration indicated 
that its “center of direction, control, and coordination” and its 
headquarters were both located in New Jersey, the Court concluded 
that Hertz’s principal place of business was New Jersey under the 
nerve-center test.51 Accordingly, Hertz was a citizen of New Jersey 
and of Delaware (i.e., Hertz’s place of incorporation),52 and was 
therefore diverse from the California-based plaintiffs.53 The Court 
then vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case to 
the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with Hertz.54 
IV.  THE APPLICATION OF HERTZ TO CAFA’S 
MINIMAL DIVERSITY PROVISION REQUIRES COMPARING 
THE POLICIES UNDERLYING § 1332(C)–(D) 
Although Hertz was a unanimous decision that provided a 
definitive test for interpreting where a corporation’s 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1) principal place of business is located, it did not mention 
how Hertz will be applied with respect to CAFA’s minimal diversity 
standard codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2). Under CAFA, federal 
courts have jurisdiction if “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a 
citizen of a State different from any defendant.”55 With respect to a 
corporate defendant that has two citizenships, however, CAFA’s 
minimal diversity requirement can be read in two ways. Must both of 
a corporate defendant’s § 1332(c)(1) citizenships be diverse from 
that of any plaintiff to warrant federal jurisdiction, or just one? 
The policy concerns underlying § 1332(c)–(d) frame the issue. 
On the one hand, § 1332(c) aimed to prevent corporations from 
removing lawsuits to federal court by giving them two citizenships 
(state of incorporation and principal place of business), thereby 
increasing the chance that one of the corporation’s citizenships 
would be the same as that of a plaintiff, destroying the complete 
diversity required for federal jurisdiction.56 On the other hand, 
§ 1332(d) sought to prevent class action plaintiffs from suing 
defendants in state courts known to be unfavorable to defendants by 
 
 51. Id. at 1195. 
 52. Id. at 1189 (finding that Hertz was incorporated in Delaware). 
 53. Id. at 1195. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
 56. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188–90. 
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only requiring minimal diversity for federal jurisdiction.57 Section 
1332(d) therefore increased the chance that a federal court would 
have jurisdiction by only requiring one of the plaintiffs to be diverse 
from any one of the defendants. Where § 1332(c) decreased the 
possibility of federal jurisdiction, § 1332 (d) increased it. But both 
provisions were promulgated in reaction to parties manipulating 
jurisdiction—a key consideration in Hertz’s applicability to CAFA’s 
minimal jurisdiction requirement. This section sets up Hertz’s 
application to CAFA by further comparing the policies underlying 
§ 1332(c) and (d). 
A.  Subsection 1332(c) Sought to Prevent Corporations from 
Manipulating Federal Court Jurisdiction 
The basic purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to grant federal 
court access to out-of-state parties who might otherwise be subject to 
local prejudice.58 Accordingly, in the First Judiciary Act of 1789, 
Congress authorized federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction 
over suits “between a citizen of the [s]tate where the suit is brought, 
and the citizen of another [s]tate.”59 However, the First Judiciary Act 
did not mention corporations.60 The Court squabbled for the ensuing 
fifty years about a corporation’s ability to invoke the federal courts’ 
diversity jurisdiction before it held in Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. 
Letson61 that a corporation was to be considered a citizen of its state 
of incorporation.62 
Problems arose, however, when corporations began 
manipulating federal court jurisdiction by filing in federal courts in 
states in which they had significant business interests but in which 
they were not incorporated.63 This circumvented the policy rationale 
of diversity jurisdiction because it gave the corporation a choice of 
two tribunals—a corporation would often choose to bring its lawsuit 
in federal court when there was little risk of prejudice against it in 
 
 57. Vairo, supra note 8, at Part I.C–D. 
 58. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188. 
 59. Id. (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2006))). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 43 U.S. 497 (1844). 
 62. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188 (citing WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3623, at 1–7). 
 63. Id. 
  
1028           LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1019 
the state court due to the corporation’s often significant contacts or 
interests in that state.64 
To combat jurisdictional frauds and abuses, the Committee on 
Jurisdiction and Venue proposed in 1951—over a century after 
Louisville—that a corporation should be “deemed a citizen of the 
state of its original creation . . . [and] shall also be deemed a citizen 
of a state where it has its principal place of business.”65 In 1958, 
Congress codified this jurisdictional test at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), 
deeming a corporation a “citizen of any [s]tate by which it has been 
incorporated and of the [s]tate where it has its principal place of 
business.”66 By creating two different citizenships, Congress 
decreased the likelihood that a corporation could manipulate federal 
court jurisdiction because complete diversity would be destroyed if 
the plaintiffs were citizens of either the corporation’s state of 
incorporation or its principal place of business.67 
B.  CAFA’s Minimal Diversity Requirement Increased Federal 
Jurisdiction over Large Class Actions 
While § 1332(c) impedes corporations’ access to federal courts, 
CAFA, codified in § 1332(d), increases their access.68 Like 
§ 1332(c), § 1332(d) was enacted in response to complaints about 
forum shopping.69 Rather than the corporation doing the forum 
shopping prior to § 1332(c), the class action plaintiffs often brought 
cases in “so-called ‘judicial hellholes’” for defendants where certain 
judges had reputations for certifying classes and awarding significant 
damages and attorney’s fees.70 
As a result, Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 to make it easier 
for defendants to remove cases to federal court.71 CAFA achieved 
 
 64. Id. at 1188–89 (citing S. REP. NO. 72–530, at 2, 4–7 (1932)). 
 65. Id. at 1189 (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4 (1951)). 
 66. Id. at 1190 (citing Act of July 25, 1985, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2006))). 
 67. Vairo, supra note 8, at Part IV.B.3, at 13. 
 68. Id. at Part I.C. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at Section I.A. In addition to expanding federal jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(d), 
CAFA also created a broad, new removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006). Id. at Section 
I.D.1.c. 
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this by amending § 1332 to abolish the complete diversity 
requirement for class actions and to require only “minimal 
diversity”: if any plaintiff is diverse from any defendant, federal 
courts have jurisdiction, and the defendant may remove the case to 
federal court.72 
V.  ANALYSIS 
What started as a statute to increase fairness for defendants, 
however, has created an unforeseen potential windfall for corporate 
defendants sued under CAFA. Section 1332(c) provides dual 
citizenship for corporations on the premise that dual citizenship will 
prevent corporations from manipulating federal court jurisdiction.73 
However, the issue under CAFA is how CAFA’s minimum diversity 
requirement will be interpreted in light of § 1332(c)’s dual 
citizenship specification.74 The courts of appeals are split on this 
issue. The Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether a corporation 
can remove to federal court based on minimum diversity between a 
member of the plaintiff class and one of the corporation’s 
defendants. 
This part proposes that Hertz, which was decided pursuant to 
CAFA, suggests that courts will interpret the relationship between 
§ 1332(c) and CAFA so as to prevent corporations from “creating” 
minimum diversity by relying on citizenship that is diverse from a 
member of the plaintiff class. 
A.  The Fourth Circuit Does Not Allow a Corporation to Create 
CAFA Jurisdiction Based on Its One Diverse Citizenship 
Some courts have held that CAFA’s minimal diversity 
requirement is not satisfied when a class includes only citizens of a 
state in which the corporate defendant is either incorporated or has 
 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2006); Vairo, supra note 8, at Part I.D.1.a. Furthermore, 
while not directly relevant here, minimum diversity is also met if any member of a class of 
plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen of a foreign state, or if any member of the plaintiff class is 
a citizen of a state and any defendant is a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(B)–(C). CAFA 
also expanded federal jurisdiction by making it easier for plaintiffs to meet the new $5 million 
amount in controversy. Id. § 1332(d)(6); Vairo, supra note 8, at Part I.D.1.a. Rather than 
requiring an individual to meet the amount in controversy, CAFA allows plaintiff class members 
to aggregate their individual damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6); Vairo, supra note 8, at Part 
I.D.1.a. 
 73. Vairo, supra note 8, at Part IV.B.3. 
 74. Id. 
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its principal place of business because the corporation cannot prove 
that there is a plaintiff who is a citizen of a state different from the 
defendant.75 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Advance America76 
is the best example of an appellate court preventing a corporation 
from creating CAFA jurisdiction based on its one diverse 
citizenship.77 Defendant Advance America argued that removal was 
proper because it met CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement—the 
corporation was incorporated in Delaware, and therefore a Delaware 
citizen, which made it diverse from the plaintiff class, all of whom 
were citizens of South Carolina.78 Although Advance America’s 
principal place of business was in South Carolina, making it also a 
South Carolina citizen, it contended that its common South Carolina 
citizenship did not destroy the minimum diversity created by CAFA 
because its Delaware citizenship was diverse from the plaintiffs’ 
South Carolina citizenship.79 
The Fourth Circuit held that Advance America could not rely on 
its Delaware citizenship to create minimal diversity with the South 
Carolina plaintiffs while ignoring that the corporation was also a 
citizen of South Carolina.80 The court explained that § 1332(c)(1)’s 
use of the conjunctive “and” between “[s]tate by which it has been 
incorporated and [s]tate where it has its principal place of business”81 
gives “dual, not alternative, citizenship to a corporation whose 
principal place of business is in a [s]tate different from the [s]tate 
where it is incorporated.”82 Therefore, the court concluded that 
§ 1332(c)(1)’s statutory language prevented Advance America from 
relying on its one diverse citizenship when its other citizenship 
 
 75. E.g. Smalls v. Advance Am., No. 2:07-3240-TLW-TER, 2008 WL 4177297, at *2 
(D.S.C. Sept. 5, 2008) (accepting report concluding that dual citizenship of a corporate defendant 
does not create minimum diversity under CAFA); Sundy v. Renewable Envtl. Solutions, LLC, 
No. 07-5069-CV-SW-ODS, 2007 WL 2994348, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2007) (finding no 
minimum diversity because corporate defendant was a citizen of Missouri and Delaware and all 
class members were citizens of either Missouri or Delaware). 
 76. 549 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 77. Id. at 934. 
 78. Id. at 933. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 935–36. 
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 82. Johnson, 549 F.3d at 935. 
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would destroy federal jurisdiction.83 
B.  One Court Permits a Corporation to Create 
CAFA Jurisdiction Based On Its One Diverse Citizenship 
In contrast, the court in Fuller v. Home Depot Services, LLC84 
held otherwise.85 There, the Northern District of Georgia found that 
defendant Home Depot had satisfied minimal diversity even though 
its principal place of business was in Georgia and the plaintiff class 
comprised citizens of Georgia because Home Depot was 
incorporated in—and was accordingly a citizen of—Delaware.86 The 
Fuller court reasoned that although Home Depot was a Georgia 
citizen, it was also a Delaware citizen, and therefore, was diverse 
from at least one member of the class as required by CAFA.87 Unlike 
the court in Johnson, the Fuller court held that the corporate 
defendant could rely on its one diverse citizenship to satisfy CAFA’s 
minimal diversity requirement.88 
C.  Hertz Suggests That a Corporate Defendant May Not Create 
Federal Jurisdiction by Counting Only One of Its Citizenships 
Johnson and Fuller each support a different method of solving 
the CAFA minimal diversity dilemma. Johnson points to a resolution 
based on the plain language of § 1332(c). Conversely, Fuller 
suggests that courts should look to Congress’s intent in passing 
CAFA to expand diversity jurisdiction over class actions.89 If a class 
of plaintiffs files its case in a “judicial hellhole,” for example, a 
corporate defendant with multiple states of citizenship can rely on its 
diverse citizenship to create minimal diversity. This comports with 
CAFA’s policy of fairness to defendants by creating minimum 
diversity that would otherwise not exist under the Johnson model. 
Two different statutes. Two different policies. One landmark 
Supreme Court case that may resolve the conflict. What the Supreme 
Court did in Hertz provides insight into how the Court might apply 
 
 83. Id. at 936. 
 84. No. 1:07-CV-1268-RLV, 2007 WL 2345257 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2007). 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. at *3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Vairo, supra note 8, at Part IV.B.3, at 14–15. 
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CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement to dual corporate citizenship 
under § 1332(c): while on the surface, the Hertz Court decided how 
to determine a corporation’s principal place of business pursuant to 
§ 1332(c), it also has provided clues for how it might determine the 
requirements of minimal diversity under CAFA. 
In particular, the Court’s thorough analysis of the statutory 
language suggests that the Court would adopt a minimal diversity 
rule, such as the one presented in Johnson. Just like the Johnson 
court hinged its jurisdictional finding on the word “and” in 
§ 1332(c), the Hertz Court determined the meaning of “principal 
place of business” under § 1332(c) based on its analysis of the words 
“principal” and “place.”90 The Court’s apparent focus on the statutory 
language suggests that the Court would likely choose a CAFA 
jurisdictional rule that best adheres to the language of the affected 
statutes, § 1332(c) and (d).91 
Focusing on the statute’s plain language is also consistent with 
federal courts’ resistance to an expansive reading of CAFA.92 In a 
study of all published CAFA cases decided between CAFA’s 
enactment on February 18, 2005, and August 18, 2007, Professors 
Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg inferred that federal judges 
considered congressional intent arguments about helping or 
hindering defendants, such as those supporting the Fuller corporate 
defendant’s ability to rely on its diverse citizenship, as secondary to 
arguments focusing on the CAFA provisions’ language.93 Among 
published district court CAFA opinions—most of which were 
removal cases and thus likely implicated citizenship questions—the 
district courts resisted an expansive reading of CAFA 63.3 percent of 
the time.94 Similarly, federal appellate courts resisted an expansive 
reading of CAFA 60 percent of the time.95 The federal courts’ 
generally narrow reading of CAFA illustrates that they would be 
more likely to favor a plain-language argument over a congressional-
intent or policy-based argument because a plain-language analysis 
 
 90. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192–93 (2010). 
 91. Vairo, supra note 8, at Part IV.B.3. 
 92. Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1579 (2008). 
 93. See id. at 1567, 1577. 
 94. Id. at 1581. 
 95. Id. at 1584. 
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arguably stays within the statute’s four corners. 
In light of these statistics and of Hertz, the Court should opt for 
the Johnson analysis because Johnson decided that corporate 
citizenship is dual rather than alternative, based on § 1332(c)’s 
language, whereas Fuller relied on congressional intent.96 
Furthermore, because of its preference for plain language, the Court 
would likely reason that if Congress intended CAFA’s minimal 
diversity provision to enable corporate defendants to “choose” their 
state of diverse citizenship to secure federal jurisdiction, then 
Congress would have amended § 1332(c) accordingly when it 
created CAFA.97 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While the Hertz Court did not address the precise minimal 
diversity issue that Johnson and Fuller raised, its emphasis on the 
statutory language suggests that the Supreme Court is more likely to 
follow Johnson than Fuller. Even though Fuller comports with 
Congress’s intent to expand federal diversity jurisdiction, given that 
(1) the Supreme Court in Hertz expressed a preference for plain-
language analysis; (2) the federal courts have statistically rejected 
expansive readings of CAFA; and (3) CAFA did not amend 
§ 1332(c) strongly suggests that Congress did not intend CAFA to 
“completely rewrite the most basic concepts in federal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence by . . . completely prevent[ing] corporate defendants 
from being sued in a class action in state court.”98 Therefore, the 
plight of the corporate defendant sued in a “judicial hellhole,” while 
providing a moderately compelling rationale for removal, cannot 
override more than fifty years of carefully worded legislative history 
designed to rein in corporate forum shopping. 
 
 96. Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 935–36 (2008); Vairo, supra note 8 at Part 
IV.B.3, at 15. 
 97. Vairo, supra note 8, at Part IV.B.3, at 18. 
 98. Id. at 15 (citing Weaver v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. C 08-03636 JSW, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 106168, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2008)). 
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